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ABSTRACT. In this paper, we present several extensions of epistemic logic with update operators
modelling public information change. Next to the well-known public announcement operators,
we also study public substitution operators. We prove many of the results regarding expressivity
and completeness using so-called reduction axioms. We develop a general method for using
reduction axioms and apply it to the logics at hand.
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1. Introduction
There are many scientiﬁc theories about information, for instance information the-
ory, probability theory, statistics, computer science, philosophy of science, and logic.
The branch of logic called epistemic logic deals with information explicitly. It was
initially developed by Hintikka (1962), whose main goal was a conceptual analysis of
knowledge and belief. In epistemic logic the focus is on statements such as ‘I know
that p’, ‘I know that you know that p’ and ‘I know that he knows that we know that p’.
Epistemiclogicisespeciallyusefulwhen appliedtosituationsinvolving morethanone
agent. One can model the information an agent has about the bare facts of the world
and the information an agent has about other agents’ information, i.e., higher-order
information. This ability to model higher-order information distinguishes epistemic
logic from other scientiﬁc theories about information.
The focus on higher-order information has led to investigations into group notions
of information of which common knowledge is a prime example. A proposition p is
common knowledge among a group of agents iff everybody in the group knows that
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p, everybody knows that everybody knows that p, and so on ad inﬁnitum. This notion
is of crucial importance if one wants to understand communication, because common
knowledge is often exactly what communication aims to achieve. Epistemic logic
with temporal operators has been applied to the analysis of Internet communication
protocols and it has been used in formal speciﬁcations of multi-agent systems (Fagin
et al., 1995; Meyer et al., 1995). There are also dynamic epistemic logics, where
change is not modelled by the passage of time, but with update operations. These
logics were developed speciﬁcally to analyse change of higher-order information. It
has been a very active research ﬁeld in the past years (Plaza, 1989; Gerbrandy et al.,
1997; Gerbrandy, 1998; Baltag et al., 1999; van Ditmarsch, 2000; Baltag, 2002; Kooi,
2003; van Ditmarsch et al., 2003; Baltag et al., 2004; Renardel de Lavalette, 2004; van
Benthem, 2006; van Benthem et al., 2006).
In epistemic logic, the information the agents have is modelled by Kripke models.
In dynamic epistemic logic, information change is modelled by manipulating these
Kripke models. The focus has mostly been on information change due to commu-
nication. One of the characteristics of communication is that it does not change the
bare facts of the world, but only the information agents have about the world and
each other. Hence, the issue of information change due to changes of facts has mostly
been left out of consideration. Notable exceptions are papers by Renardel de Lavalette
(2004), van Eijck (2004) and van Ditmarsch et al. (2005b). In this paper, updates
where the bare facts of the world can change are studied alongside updates that model
communication.
The focus in this paper is not on full-ﬂedged dynamic epistemic logics with op-
erators for complex communicative updates. Instead the focus is on the simple case
of public updates: events where all agents get the same information and where it is
common knowledge (among all agents) that they get the same information. Such pub-
lic updates can be of two forms: communicative or fact changing. The technical term
for the former is public announcement and for the latter I use the term public sub-
stitution. Public announcements are public updates where all the agents commonly
receive the information that a certain formula is true. In the semantics the effect of
a public announcement is modelled by adapting the model such that all the worlds
where that formula is false are no longer considered possible by the agents. This
was ﬁrst introduced by Plaza (1989) and independently by Gerbrandy and Groeneveld
(1997). Public substitutions are public updates where all the agents commonly receive
the information that the truth value of a certain propositional variable has changed
to the truth value of a (possibly) complex formula. In the semantics the effect of a
public substitution is modelled by adapting the model such that after the substitution
the propositional variable is true in those worlds where the complex formula was true
before the substitution.
A logic with both these kinds of operators was introduced by van Ditmarsch et
al. (2005b), but the issues of axiomatisation and expressivity were not addressed in
that paper. This led to the investigations reported in the present paper, concerning the
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turns out, the logic introduced by van Ditmarsch et al. (2005b) is more expressive than
the logic without public substitutions. Based on the observation that its expressivity is
equal to the logic of relativised common knowledge – a logic studied by Kooi and van
Benthem (2004), and van Benthem et al. (2005; 2006) – in the present paper a sound
and complete axiomatisation is obtained.
In Section 2, the languages and semantics of the logics that will be studied are in-
troduced. In Section 3, I prove general theorems about expressivity and completeness
via so-called reduction axioms. In Section 4, these results are applied to the logics
introduced in Section 2. A case of special interest is studied separately in Section 5.
In Section 6, conclusions are drawn and directions for further research are indicated.
2. Languages and semantics
We introduce a number of logical languages and their semantics that will be stud-
ied in this paper. Relativised common knowledge is also introduced, because it will
turn out to be quite important when we look at the expressivity of epistemic logic with
public announcements, substitutions, and common knowledge. I use the style of nota-
tion from propositional dynamic logic (PDL) for modal operators which was also used
by van Benthem et al. (2006).
DEFINITION 1 (LANGUAGES). — Let a ﬁnite set of agents A and a countably inﬁnite
set of propositional variables P be given. The language LAPSCR is given by the
following Backus-Naur Form (where ϕ are formulas, α are modalities, and σ are
public substitutions):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | [α]ϕ
α ::= a | ϕ | σ | B+ | (B;?ϕ)+
σ ::= p := ϕ | p := ϕ,σ
where p ∈ P, a ∈ A, and B ⊆ A. Besides the usual abbreviations [B]ϕ will be used
as an abbreviation of
V
a∈B[a]ϕ. Only substitutions σ such that any propositional
variable p occurs at most once on the left side of a ‘:=’ are considered. In this way
σ can be seen as a ﬁnite, and hence partial, function from propositional variables to
formulas. By abuse of language, I use σ(p) to refer to the formula assigned to p if
p ∈ dom(σ), and to refer to p otherwise. Various sublanguages will be considered,
where α is restricted. The subscripts of L below indicate whether Agents, Public
announcements, Substitutions, Common knowledge, or Relativised common knowl-
edge are included. For instance LASR is the language with agents, substitutions and
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The non-standard expressions in the deﬁnition above are read as follows:
[a]ϕ Agent a knows that ϕ.
[B]ϕ Everybody in group B knows that ϕ.
[ϕ]ψ ψ is the case after the announcement that ϕ.
[σ]ϕ ϕ is the case after the substitution σ.
p := ϕ,q := ψ p changes to ϕ and simultaneously q changes to ψ.
[B+]ϕ ϕ is common knowledge among the members of
group B.
[(B;?ϕ)+]ψ ψ is common knowledge among the members of
group B relative to ϕ.
The most difﬁcult of these is relativised common knowledge. One can understand it in
thesamewayone canunderstand ordinarycommon knowledge. “ϕiscommon knowl-
edge if everyone knows that ϕ is common knowledge” is a way of explaining what it
means that something is common knowledge. The circularity of this explanation can
be understood as a ﬁxed point construction. In the same way we can characterise rela-
tivised common knowledge: “ϕ is common knowledge relative to ψ if everyone knows
that if ψ, then ϕ is common knowledge relative to ψ.”
Logics with substitution operators have been studied before. One of the epis-
temic actions considered by Baltag (2002) is a ‘ﬂip’ action, where the extension of
a propositional variable (the set of worlds in which the variable is true) changes to its
complement. Renardel de Lavalette (2004) considers more general changes of truth
values where the extension of a propositional variable can change to the extension
of an arbitrary formula, but this logic does not contain a common knowledge opera-
tor. Simultaneous substitutions were added to action models by van Eijck (2004), and
actions models with substitutions were adopted in the logic of communication and
change (LCC) by van Benthem et al. (2006). Here they are studied as modal operators
in themselves. One might expect that simultaneity adds expressivity, yet it does not
make a difference in terms of expressivity (see Section 4). However, simultaneity does
allow more succinct formulas.
Although the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘common knowledge’ are used, I also con-
sider belief and common belief. In fact the semantics given below is more suited for
the case of belief. The results below also apply to the general modal case, where
these operators do not even have an epistemic or doxastic interpretation. In order to
keep things simple I only use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘common knowledge’. The
language is interpreted in multi-agent Kripke models.
DEFINITION 2 (MULTI-AGENT KRIPKE MODELS). — Let a ﬁnite set of agents
A and a countably inﬁnite set of propositional variables P be given. A multi-agent
Kripke model M is a triple (W,R,V ) such that
– W is a non-empty set of worlds,
– R : A → ℘(W × W) assigns an accessibility relation to each agent a,
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A multi-agent Kripke model M with a distinguished world w ∈ W is called a pointed
model (M,w). Below we will also refer to pointed models as models.
The accessibility relation assigned to an agent in these models is interpreted epis-
temically: (w,v) ∈ R(a) indicates that if w is the actual world, then agent a cannot
rule out that world v is the actual world on the basis of its information.
Since the results below do not depend on whether the accessibility relations be
reﬂexive, transitive, or euclidean, these extra requirements are not imposed. The lan-
guage is interpreted in pointed models, where the distinguished world is taken to be
the actual world.
DEFINITION 3 (SEMANTICS). — Let a multi-agent Kripke model (M,w) with M =
(W,R,V ) be given. Let a ∈ A, B ⊆ A, and ϕ,ψ ∈ LAPSCR.
(M,w) |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
(M,w) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,w)  |= ϕ
(M,w) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M,w) |= ϕ and (M,w) |= ψ
(M,w) |= [a]ϕ iff (M,v) |= ϕ for all v such that (w,v) ∈ R(a)
(M,w) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (Mϕ,w) |= ψ
(M,w) |= [σ]ϕ iff (Mσ,w) |= ϕ
(M,w) |= [B+]ϕ iff (M,v) |= ϕ for all v such that (w,v) ∈ R(B)+
(M,w) |= [(B;?ϕ)+]ψ iff (M,v) |= ψ for all v such that
(w,v) ∈ (R(B) ∩ (W × [[ϕ]]M))+
The updated model Mϕ = (W,Rϕ,V ) is deﬁned by restricting the accessibility re-
lations to those worlds where ϕ holds. [[ϕ]]M denotes the set {v ∈ W|M,v |= ϕ}.
Now
Rϕ(a) =def R(a) ∩ (W × [[ϕ]]M)(= {(w,v) ∈ R(a) | (M,v) |= ϕ}).
The updated model Mσ = (W,R,V σ) is deﬁned by changing the valuation accord-
ingly.
V σ(p) =def [[σ(p)]]M
In the clauses for [B+]ϕ and [(B;?ϕ)+]ψ we use R(B) to denote
S
a∈B R(a) and
the superscript + denotes the transitive closure. (The transitive closure of a binary
relation R is the smallest transitive relation that contains R.)
A formula ϕ is a tautology iff ϕ is true in all models: (M,w) |= ϕ for all (M,w).
This is denoted as |= ϕ.
The semantics differs a little from the semantics given by van Ditmarsch et al.
(2005b), where only the S5 case was considered. In order to preserve S5 under public
announcements it was required that the announced formula is true, otherwise the an-
nouncement cannot be executed, and Rϕ(a) = R(a) ∩ [[ϕ]]
2
M. Deﬁnition 3 provides
the semantics for the general modal case where the public update merely restricts ac-
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setting, a public announcement represents the event where the agents simply take the
information to be true, even though they may be wrong.
Many performative speech acts classiﬁed by Austin (1962) as exercitives are ex-
amples of public substitutions. For example:
1) You’re disqualiﬁed.
2) I choose George.
3) You’re ﬁred.
4) I sentence you to death.
5) I pronounce you husband and wife.
When the sentences above are uttered in the right circumstances, their utterance makes
them true. So, all these examples could be expressed in our logical language as ‘p :=
⊤’ (or as ‘p := ⊥’). Such performative speech acts cannot be modelled as public
announcements. Public announcements, considered as speech acts, could be classiﬁed
as expositives, where the utterance of a sentence merely informs the listeners that the
sentence is true.
The following is another simple example of a public substitution. Suppose there
are two agents a and b in a room. Agent a is blind, and can therefore not see whether
the light in the room is on. Agent b is not visually impaired, and can therefore see
whether the light is on. All this is common knowledge among the agents. Let p be
the proposition ‘the light is on’. Suppose that now the light switch is ﬂicked. Neither
agent is deaf and this is also common knowledge among both agents. So, it is common
knowledge among the agents that the substitution ‘p := ¬p’ has occurred. Agent a
still does not know whether the light is in fact on or not, but does know that the truth
value of p has changed. Agent b does know whether p. This public substitution is
illustrated by Figure 1. This example shows that one might want to substitute using
complex formulas rather than just ⊤ or ⊥. It is also clear that if more than one fact
changes at once, then one wants to model this using simultaneous substitutions.
p := ¬p
Figure 1. Two Kripke models: the left one represents the situation before the public
substitution p := ¬p; the one on the right represents the situation after the public
substitution p := ¬p. A world where p is true is represented by a solid bullet. A world
where p is false is represented by an open bullet
As a ﬁnal example of how public substitutions can be used, consider the Sum and
Product puzzle. Mr. Sum and Mr. Product do not know the length or width of a room.
They do know that these are natural numbers between 2 and 99 and that the length is
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to Mr. Sum, and their product is given to Mr. Product. All this is common knowledge
among Mr. Sum and Mr. Product. Now the following conversation takes place:
Mr. Product: I don’t know the numbers.
Mr. Sum: I knew you didn’t know. I don’t know either.
Mr. Product: Now I know the numbers.
Mr. Sum: Now I know them too.
The length and width of the room can be deduced from the dialogue by an out-
sider.1 The original formulation and solution of the problem was given by Freudenthal
(1969; 1970) in Dutch. The formulation above is by McCarthy (1990). This problem
has been analysed using LAPC by van Ditmarsch et al. (2005a). The utterance ‘I
knew you didn’t know’ poses a problem for this approach. The past tense cannot be
represented in LAPC. Van Ditmarsch et al. (2005a) solve this by noting that the ﬁrst
announcement is superﬂuous given the second: the dialogue might just as well start
with Mr. Sum saying ‘I know that you don’t know what the number are.’ However,
such solutions are not generally available in all scenarios where a past tense occurs.
In LAPSC there is a more natural way to represent past tenses (although it would
be quite unsatisfactory to a linguist). Suppose that after the announcement that ϕ, one
learns that ψ was the case before the update. The formula
[p := ψ][ϕ][p]χ
where p does not occur in ϕ, ψ or χ, expresses this. It is as if the truth value of ψ
has been put into an envelope before the update, and the envelope is opened publicly
afterwards, thereby making it common knowledge what the old truth value of ψ is.
Using this general approach one could show with the semantics of LAPSC that the
adaptation of the scenario proposed by van Ditmarsch et al. (2005a) is indeed correct.
Another approach to announcements involving the past tense is to extend the language
with temporal operators. This is investigated by Yap (2006).
3. Reduction
In the completeness proofs of many of the logics introduced in Section 2 reduction
axioms play an important role. A typical example of a reduction axiom is
[ϕ][a]ψ ↔ [a](ϕ → [ϕ]ψ)
This is called a reduction axiom because going from the left of the equivalence to
the right the complexity of the formula to which the announcement operator is ap-
plied reduces. These reduction axioms also play an important role in results about
the expressivity of the logics under consideration. If the reduction can be continued
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depending on the logical form of ψ until no announcement operators remain, one can
show that the language with announcement operators is just as expressive as the lan-
guage without them. The method of proving completeness and equal expressivity for
dynamic epistemic logic using reduction axioms has been used many times in the lit-
erature (Plaza, 1989; Gerbrandy, 1998; Baltag et al., 1999; van Benthem et al., 2006).
Here we provide a uniform setup, that provides such a general perspective on reduc-
tion axioms that it can be applied to many logics. In this section I provide this general
method, which is applied to the logics under consideration in Section 4.
The general setup is given by two logical languages L1 and L2 such that L1 is
a sublanguage of L2. The only difference is that L2 contains additional operators.
In order to show that the languages are equally expressive one needs to be able to
translate each formula ϕ from L2 to an equivalent formula ψ in L1. This translation
procedure is captured by the reduction axioms. These axioms make ϕ and ψ provably
equivalent. In this way one can obtain completeness for L2 via completeness for L1.
After giving a general deﬁnition of reduction axioms in Section 3.1, I prove a general
theorem about expressivity and reduction axioms in Section 3.2, and prove a general
theorem about completeness and reduction axioms in Section 3.3.
3.1. Depth and reduction axioms
Reduction axioms allow one to reduce the depth of the formulas to which the addi-
tional operators apply. In the proof of Theorem 10 (which states sufﬁcient conditions
for two languages to be equally expressive) three notions of depth are needed, namely:
(ordinary) depth, O depth, and O reduction depth. The main induction is on the O
depth, and in the induction step of this proof another induction on the O reduction
depth is embedded. The deﬁnition of a reduction axiom is given in terms of the O
reduction depth. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the notion of ordinary depth precisely.
DEFINITION 4 (DEPTH). — Let a logical language L be given. The depth d : L →
N is given inductively as follows:
d(ϕ) =def 0 if no logical operators occur in ϕ
d(￿(ϕ1,...,ϕn)) =def 1 + max({d(ϕi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n})
where ￿ is some n-ary operator.
This is a very abstract way of looking at logical language. For a concrete language
one has to specify what the logical operators are and what their arity is. The language
LAPSCR contains formulas and other expressions. It is clear that, for instance, con-
junction is a binary operator. We take [a] to be unary operator. An announcement
operator is a binary operator. For instance in the formula [ϕ]ψ, the two arguments are
ϕ and ψ. A substitution operator [σ] is an (n + 1)-ary operator, where n is the cardi-
nality of dom(σ): for instance a formula of the form [p := ϕ,r := ψ]χ takes ϕ, ψ,
and χ as arguments. Therefore d([p := ϕ,r := ψ]χ) = 1 + max(d(ϕ),d(ψ),d(χ)).Public update logics 239
A limit case would be a nullary operator. Since a nullary operator has no arguments
its depth is 1 (the maximum depth of formulas in the empty set is 0).
For the operators one wants to eliminate from the language, a special notion of
depth is needed, which indicates to what extent the extra operators are nested.
DEFINITION 5 (O DEPTH). — Let O be a set of operators in L. The O depth
Od : L → N is given inductively as follows:
Od(ϕ) =def 0 if no logical operators occur in ϕ
Od(￿(ϕ1,...,ϕn)) =def
￿
max({Od(ϕi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}) if ￿  ∈ O
1 + max({Od(ϕi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}) if ￿ ∈ O.
Below we will take O to be the set of logical operators that occur only in L2, i.e.
the language to be reduced. The third notion of depth is called the O-reduction depth,
which indicates how complex the formulas are to which an outermost O operator
applies.
DEFINITION 6 (O REDUCTION DEPTH). — Let O be a set of operators in L. The
O reduction depth Ord : L → N is deﬁned inductively as follows.
Ord(ϕ) =def 0 if no logical operators occur in ϕ
Ord(￿(ϕ1,...,ϕn)) =def
￿
max({Ord(ϕi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}) if ￿  ∈ O
1 +
Pn
i=1 d(ϕi) if ￿ ∈ O.
Note that in the second case of the second clause of this deﬁnition the ordinary
notion of depth is used. A general deﬁnition of reduction axioms can be given in
terms of O reduction depth.
DEFINITION 7 (REDUCTION AXIOMS). — Given are two languages L1 and L2
such that L1 is a sublanguage of L2, because L2 contains more logical operators,
assembled in a set of operators O. A reduction axiom is a formula of the form ϕ ↔ ψ
such that Ord(ϕ) > Ord(ψ).
Of course, such axioms are only useful if they are sound and the proof system
actually allows one to perform substitutions. The rule one wants to use in this case
is the rule of substitution of equivalents. In a proof system this rule allows one to
infer from ϕ ↔ ψ, that χ ↔ χ′, where χ′ can be obtained from χ by substituting an
occurrence of ϕ by ψ.
3.2. Equal expressivity via reduction
Let us clarify what it means for one logical language to be more expressive than
another. Let us ﬁrst distinguish the richness of a language from its expressivity. When
one language contains more logical operators than another, the one language is richer.240 JANCL – 17/2007. Belief revision and dynamic logic
In many cases a new operator is added to enrich a language because there is an im-
portant concept that is not yet captured in the language. This does not imply that
the expressivity is actually extended. When one language can make more distinctions
in the class of models in which it is interpreted than another, then the one language
is more expressive than the other. In propositional logic, disjunction is an important
concept. However, when one adds it to the language that already contains conjunction
and negation it does not add any expressivity. Let us deﬁne expressivity formally.
DEFINITION 8 (EXPRESSIVITY). — Let two logical languages L1 and L2 that are
interpreted in the same class of models be given.
– L1 is at least as expressive as L2 iff for every formula ϕ2 ∈ L2 there is a
formula ϕ1 ∈ L1 such that ϕ1 and ϕ2 are true in the same models. This is denoted as
L1   L2.
– L1 and L2 are equally expressive iff L1   L2 and L2   L1. This is denoted
as L1 ≡ L2.
– L1 is more expressive than L2 iff L1   L2 and L2  ≡ L1. This is denoted as
L1 ≻ L2.
Note that this deﬁnition focuses on the expressivity of formulas. One could just
as well focus on the expressivity of modalities and see which relations on the set of
worlds and on the class of models can be expressed. Here we focus on the expressivity
of formulas.
The presence of reduction axioms for a set of operators suggests that the language
with the additional operators is just as expressive as the language without them. In this
section and the next we will give very general conditions under which the presence
of reduction axioms yields two equally expressive languages and general conditions
underwhichtheseaxiomscanprovideacompleteproofsystemforthericherlanguage.
One of the conditions is that ↔ gets its usual interpretation, and that hence the rule of
substitution of equivalents is valid. The following lemma is used in the induction step
of the main theorem regarding expressivity (Theorem 10).
LEMMA 9. — Given are two languages L1 and L2 such that L2 is an extension
of L1 with a set of logical operators O. Moreover, L2 contains ↔. Given is also a
semantics for L2 (and hence a semantics for L1) in some class of models. Finally a
set A of reduction axioms for O is given such that every formula which is not in L1
has at least one subformula ϕ such that there is a formula ψ and ϕ ↔ ψ is in A. If the
reduction axioms A and the rule of substitution of equivalents are sound for L2, then
for all ϕ ∈ L2 with Od(ϕ) = 1, there is a formula ψ ∈ L1 such that |= ϕ ↔ ψ.
PROOF. — Suppose that Od(ϕ) = 1. The remainder of the proof is by induction
on Ord(ϕ). Suppose Ord(ϕ) = 0. Therefore ϕ contains no operators in O, and so
ϕ ∈ L1. Since |= ϕ ↔ ϕ, we are done.
Suppose as induction hypothesis that for every ϕ such that Ord(ϕ) ≤ n, there is a
formula ψ ∈ L1 such that |= ϕ ↔ ψ.Public update logics 241
Suppose that Ord(ϕ) = n + 1. Therefore ϕ contains at least one formula of the
form￿(χ1,...,χk)where￿ ∈ O andOrd(￿(χ1,...,χk) = n+1. Accordingtoour
assumption ￿(χ1,...,χk) has at least one subformula such that there is a reduction
axiom for it. But, since the O depth of ￿(χ1,...,χk) equals 1 by assumption, the
only formula for which that can be true is ￿(χ1,...,χk) itself. So there must be a
formula ξ such that ￿(χ1,...,χk) ↔ ξ ∈ A and Ord(￿(χ1,...,χk)) > Ord(ξ).
Now, the induction hypothesis applies to ξ and therefore there is a formula ξ′ ∈ L1
that is equivalent to ￿(χ1,...,χk). There is such a formula for each subformula of ϕ
which has the form ￿(χ1,...,χk) where Ord(￿(χ1,...,χk) ≤ n+1. By repeatedly
applying the rule of substitution of equivalents one can obtain a formula ψ ∈ L1.
Since the reduction axioms are sound and the rule of substitution of equivalents is
sound it follows that |= ϕ ↔ ψ. ￿
This lemma will be used in the induction step of the following theorem.
THEOREM 10. — Given are two languages L1 and L2 such that L2 is an extension
of L2 with a set of logical operators O. Moreover, L2 contains ↔. Given is one
semantics for L2 in some class of models. Given is a set A of reduction axioms for O
such that every formula which is not in L1 has at least one subformula ϕ such that
there is a formula ψ and ϕ ↔ ψ is in A. If ϕ ↔ ϕ, the reduction axioms A and
the rule of substitution of equivalents are sound for L2, then L1 and L2 have equal
expressivity.
PROOF. — It is given that L1 is a sublanguage of L2. So it is clear that L2   L1.
In order to show that L1   L2 we have to prove that for every formula ϕ ∈ L2, there
is a formula ψ ∈ L1 such that |= ϕ ↔ ψ. We show this by induction on the O depth.
If the O depth is 0, then ϕ ∈ L1. It is clear that |= ϕ ↔ ϕ.
Suppose as induction hypothesis that for every ϕ ∈ L2 with Od(ϕ) ≤ n, then
there is a ψ ∈ L2 such that |= ϕ ↔ ψ.
Suppose that Od(ϕ) = n + 1. Therefore ϕ contains at least one subformula
of the form ￿(χ1,...,χk) where ￿ ∈ O. For all χi it holds that Od(χi) ≤ n.
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis for each χi there is a ξi ∈ L1 such that
|= χi ↔ ξi. By repeatedly applying the rule of substitution of equivalents one can
show that |= ￿(χ1,...,χk) ↔ ￿(ξ1,...,ξk). The O depth of ￿(ξ1,...,ξk) is 1.
Now by Lemma 9 there is a formula ξ ∈ L1 such that |= ￿(ξ1,...,ξk) ↔ ξ. Since
an arbitrary subformula of ϕ was taken, one can repeatedly apply the rule of substitu-
tion of equivalents and ﬁnd a formula in ψ ∈ L1 such that |= ϕ ↔ ψ. ￿
3.3. Completeness via reduction
In the previous section it was shown how reduction axioms can be used to show
that two languages are equally expressive: for every formula in the one language there
exists an equivalent formula in the other language. The proof via reduction axioms
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formula in the poorer language in a systematic way by repeatedly substituting subfor-
mulas according to reduction axioms, all the time decreasing the O reduction depth.
Therefore if the reduction axioms and the rule of substitution of equivalents are added
to a complete proof system for the poorer language, one obtains a complete proof sys-
tem for the richer language, because the reduction can now take place within the proof
system. In this way a provably equivalent formula is found. The proof of completeness
is quite similar to the case of expressivity.
THEOREM 11. — Given are two languages L1 and L2 such that L2 is an extension
of L1 with a set of logical operators O. Moreover, L2 contains ↔. Given is one
semantics for L2 in some class of models. Given is a Hilbert style proof system PS
which is sound and complete for L1 with respect to the given semantics and class of
models. Given is a set A of reduction axioms for O such that every formula which is
not in L1 has at least one subformula ϕ such that there is a formula ψ and ϕ ↔ ψ
is in A. If the proof system PS + A together with ϕ ↔ ϕ and the rule of substitution
of equivalents (which we also refer to as PS + A) is sound for L2, then it is also
complete for L2.
PROOF. — Analogous to the proof of Theorem 10, we can show that by for every
formula ϕ ∈ L2, there is a formula ψ ∈ L1 such that ⊢PS+A ϕ ↔ ψ. The proof is by
induction on Od(ϕ), where the induction step is an induction on Ord(ϕ). We do not
provide details.
To prove completeness, suppose that |= ϕ for a formula in L2. There is a ψ ∈ L1
such that ⊢PS+A ϕ ↔ ψ. By the soundness of PS + A it follows that |= ψ. By
completeness for L1 of PS it follows that ⊢PS ψ. Since a proof in PS is also a proof
in PS + A, it follows that ⊢PS+A ψ as well. By the rule of substitution of equivalents
it follows that ⊢PS+A ϕ. ￿
4. Reducing public updates
In this section I will apply the results obtained in the previous section to some of
the logics that were deﬁned in Section 2. In order to apply the results we need:
1) semantics for the relevant sublanguages of LAPSCR,
2) sound and complete Hilbert style proof systems for the relevant sublanguages
of LAPSCR,
3) soundness of the rule of substitution of equivalents, and
4) a set of reduction axioms.
The semantics for the entire language LAPSCR has been provided in Section 2, and
thereby also for all its sublanguages. Fortunately, the literature provides Hilbert style
proof systems for the logics without public updates. See (Fagin et al., 1995; Meyer et
al., 1995) for systems for LA and LAC, and see (Kooi et al., 2004) for a proof system
for LAR. So all that remains to be shown is that the rule of substitution of equivalents
is sound. Moreover, we need to provide a set of reduction axioms, especially for the
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Let us brieﬂy discuss the earlier completeness and expressivity results regarding
these logics. Plaza (1989) introduced LAP and provided a sound and complete proof
system for it. Indeed Plaza used reduction axioms and showed that LA and LAP are
equally expressive, thus obtaining an easy completeness proof via completeness for
LA. The fact that LAC is more expressive than LA is folklore. A complete proof
system for LAC was obtained by adapting the results on propositional dynamic logic,
of which the most readable completeness proof is considered to be Kozen and Parikh
(1981). Baltag et al. (1999) showed, contrary to what was expected given Plaza’s
result, that LAPC is more expressive than LAC. This makes a completeness proof
for LAPC much harder, and one cannot make do with just reduction axioms. Yet a
proof system for LAPC is provided by Baltag et al. (1999). Kooi and van Benthem
(2004) provided a complete proof system for LAR, also based on the paper by Kozen
and Parikh (1981), and it was shown that LAR and LAPR are equally expressive by
reduction axioms. It was established that LAR is more expressive than LAPC by van
Benthem et al. (2005). These results are shown in Figure 2 together with the new
results obtained in this section.
All the new results regarding expressivity and completeness of these logics ex-
cept completeness for LAPSC (see Section 5) will be dealt with using the following
reduction axioms.
DEFINITION 12 (REDUCTION AXIOMS). —
1) [ϕ]p ↔ p
2) [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ ¬[ϕ]ψ
3) [ϕ](ψ ∧ χ) ↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ)
4) [ϕ][a]ψ ↔ [a](ϕ → [ϕ]ψ)
5) [ϕ][(B;?ψ)+]χ ↔ [(B;?(ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ))+][ϕ]χ
6) [σ]p ↔ σ(p)
7) [σ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[σ]ϕ
8) [σ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ([σ]ϕ ∧ [σ]ψ)
9) [σ][a]ϕ ↔ [a][σ]ϕ
10) [σ][B+]ϕ ↔ [B+][σ]ϕ
11) [σ][(B;?ϕ)+]ψ ↔ [(B;?[σ]ϕ)+][σ]ψ
12) [B+]ϕ ↔ [(B;?⊤)+]ϕ
13) [(B;?ϕ)+]ψ ↔ [p := ψ][ϕ][B+]p where p does not occur in ϕ.
Although these axioms are called reduction axioms, they are not reduction axioms
in themselves, but, following Deﬁnition 7, only relative to some set of logical oper-
ators. Indeed, in some cases (such as in the proof system for LAPC) they cannot
be construed as reduction axioms. Below it will be clear that in the proper context
they are reduction axioms for their leftmost logical operator. One can immediately see
that, in that case, the O reduction depth is strictly less on the right hand side of the
equivalence. Axioms 1, 6, 12 and 13 are unlike the other reduction axiom in that they
directly reduce the O depth (thereby reducing the O reduction depth). Axioms 1 and
6 might well be dubbed elimination axioms, since there is one less modal operator on
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refers to the formula assigned to p if p ∈ dom(σ), and to refer to p otherwise. One
might say axioms 12 and 13 are translation axioms, because operators are replaced.
That p does not occur in ϕ is called a freshness condition. This kind of condition also
occurs in the axioms for quantiﬁers in ﬁrst order logic. In order to apply the theorems
of the previous section, it needs to be established that these axioms are sound.
LEMMA 13. — All reduction axioms are sound.
PROOF. — For the soundness of reduction axioms 1–4 I refer to Plaza (1989). For
the soundness of reduction axiom 5 I refer to Kooi and van Benthem (2004). In all the
proofs below we use the semantics provided in Deﬁnition 3.
6) (M,w) |= [σ]p iff (Mσ,w) |= p. The latter is the case iff w ∈ V σ(p). This is
the case iff (M,w) |= σ(p).
7) (M,w) |= [σ]¬ϕ iff (Mσ,w) |= ¬ϕ. The latter is the case iff (Mσ,w)  |= ϕ.
This is the case iff (M,w)  |= [σ]ϕ, which is equivalent to (M,w) |= ¬[σ]ϕ.
8) (M,w) |= [σ](ϕ ∧ ψ) iff (Mσ,w) |= (ϕ ∧ ψ). The latter is the case iff
(Mσ,w) |= ϕ and (Mσ,w) |= ψ, which is equivalent to (M,w) |= [σ]ϕ and
(M,w) |= [σ]ψ. This is equivalent to (M,w) |= [σ]ϕ ∧ [σ]ψ.
9) (M,w) |= [σ][a]ϕ iff (Mσ,w) |= [a]ϕ. The latter is the case iff (Mσ,v) |= ϕ
for all v such that (w,v) ∈ R(a), which is equivalent to (M,v) |= [σ]ϕ for all v such
that (w,v) ∈ R(a). This is equivalent to (M,w) |= [a][σ]ϕ.
10) (M,w) |= [σ][B+]ϕ iff (Mσ,w) |= [B+]ϕ. The latter is the case iff
(Mσ,v) |= ϕ for all v such that (w,v) ∈ R(B)+, which is equivalent to (M,v) |=
[σ]ϕ for all v such that (w,v) ∈ R(B)+. This is equivalent to (M,w) |= [B+][σ]ϕ.
11) (M,w) |= [σ][(B;?ϕ)+]ψ iff (Mσ,w) |= [(B;?ϕ)+]ψ. The latter is the case
iff (Mσ,v) |= ψ for all v such that (w,v) ∈ (R(B) ∩ (W × [[ϕ]]Mσ)+, which is
equivalent to (M,v) |= [σ]ψ for all v such that (w,v) ∈ (R(B) ∩ (W × [[[σ]ϕ]]M)+.
This is equivalent to (M,w) |= [(B;?[σ]ϕ)+][σ]ψ.
12) Note that R(B) ⊆ (W ×W) and that [[⊤]] = W. Therefore R(B)+ = (R(B)∩
(W × [[⊤]]))+. (M,w) |= [B+]ϕ iff (M,v) |= ϕ for all v such that (w,v) ∈ R(B)+.
Given the observation above, the latter is equivalent to (M,v) |= v for all v such that
(w,v) ∈ (R(B) ∩ (W × [[⊤]]))+. This is equivalent to (M,w) |= [(B;?⊤)+]ϕ.
13) Since p does not occur in ϕ, the substitution p := ψ does not affect the
extension of ϕ. Therefore [[ϕ]]M = [[ϕ]]Mp:=ψ. So (M,w) |= [(B;?ϕ)+]ψ iff
(M,v) |= ψ for all v such that (w,v) ∈ (R(B) ∩ (W × [[ϕ]]Mp:=ψ))+. Note that
the relation (R(B) ∩ (W × [[ϕ]]Mp:=ψ))+ is identical to Rϕ(B)+. Note also that
|= ψ ↔ [p := ψ]p. Therefore (M,w) |= [(B;?ϕ)+]ψ iff (M,v) |= [p := ψ]p for
all v such that (w,v) ∈ Rϕ(B)+, which is equivalent to (Mp:=ψ,v) |= p for all v
such that (w,v) ∈ Rϕ(B)+. This is equivalent to (Mp:=ψ,w) |= [ϕ][B+]p, which is
equivalent to (M,w) |= [p := ψ][ϕ][B+]p. ￿
Note that the rule of substitution of equivalents is sound for all the logics under
consideration.
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The proof of this lemma is left to the reader. It is not that difﬁcult to show that this
rule is derivable in K (see Hughes and Cresswell (1996, p.32)). The lemma follows by
the soundness of the proof systems. It is also possible to show that this rule is derivable
in all the systems we are going to consider (if we have necessitation and distribution
for α), but since this would distract from the main line of the paper, we just add it to
the proof systems.
4.1. Expressivity of public updates
Now that the soundness of the reduction axioms and the rule of substitution of
equivalents is established, it is easy to obtain expressivity results for a great number of
logics using the reduction axioms. See Figure 2 for a graphic representation of these
results together with previously established results.
In this paper only the equal expressivity of languages is directly shown. The fact
that some languages are more expressive than others follows from these new results
combined with previously obtained results.
THEOREM 15. —
1) LA ≡ LAP ≡ LAS ≡ LAPS
2) LAC ≡ LASC
3) LAR ≡ LAPR ≡ LASR ≡ LAPSR ≡ LACR ≡ LASCR ≡ LAPCR ≡
LAPSCR ≡ LAPSC
PROOF. — In all three cases above Theorem 10 applies. We have one semantics for
LAPSCR, and all languages under consideration are sublanguages of it. We already
showed that all reduction axioms are sound as well as the rule for substitutions of
equivalents (Lemma 13 and 14). All that remains to be shown is that for each formula
in the richer language which is not in the poorer language there is a subformula for
which there is a reduction axiom.
1) To see that LA ≡ LAP, let the set of reduction axioms A be reduction ax-
ioms 1–4 of Deﬁnition 12. It is easy to see that each formula in LAP that is not in
LA contains a subformula for which there is a reduction axiom. An innermost nested
occurrence of an announcement operator precedes a formula which is either a propo-
sitional variable, a negation, a conjunction, or a knowledge formula. For each of these
cases there is a reduction axiom. Therefore, by Theorem 10, LA ≡ LAP.
To see that LA ≡ LAS, let the set of reduction axioms A be reduction axioms 6–
9 of Deﬁnition 12. Again, it is easy to see that each formula in LAS that is not
in LA contains a subformula for which there is a reduction axiom. Therefore, by
Theorem 10, LA ≡ LAS.
To see that LA ≡ LAPS, we simply take the union of the sets of reduction axioms
above. Now one simplytakes one ofthe innermost nested occurrences ofa substitution
or a public announcement operator to see that every formula in LAPS which is not
in LA contains a subformula for which there is a reduction axiom. Therefore, by
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A
AC
AR
ACR
AP
APC
APR
APCR
AS
ASC
ASR
ASCR
APS
APSC
APSR
APSCR
Figure 2. An arrow S → T indicates that LT is more expressive than LS. A double
arrow S ↔ T indicates that LS is equally expressive as LT. The dashed arrows
indicate previously established results. The black arrows indicate new results. For the
sake of readability all reﬂexive arrows are omitted and not all transitive arrows are
shown. The differently shaded areas indicate the equivalence classes. The lighter gray
the area is, the more expressive the languages in it are
2) Here we take reduction axioms 6–10 of Deﬁnition 12. From Theorem 10 it
follows that LAC ≡ LASC by similar reasoning as above.
3) To see that LAR ≡ LAPR ≡ LASR ≡ LAPSR is completely analogous to
the case LA ≡ LAP ≡ LAS ≡ LAPS, except now axioms 5 and 11 of Deﬁnition 12
are used as well.
Using axiom 12 of Deﬁnition 12 it can be shown that LAR ≡ LACR, that LAPR ≡
LAPCR, that LASR ≡ LASCR, and that LAPSR ≡ LAPSCR.
To see that LAPSC also belongs to this set of languages, observe that it can be shown
that LAPSC ≡ LAPSCR with axiom 13 of Deﬁnition 12. ￿Public update logics 247
The most surprising of these results is that LAR ≡ LAPSC. The motivations for
these two logics are quite different. Now it turns out that they have the same expressive
power.
From Theorem 15 together with earlier results, it follows that LAPSC ≺ LAPC,
since LAR ≺ LAPC and LAR ≡ LAPSC. As can be seen in Figure 2 this is the only
case where adding public substitutions to a language extends its expressive power.
This is also quite surprising.
As an aside, observe that the substitution in translation axiom 13 is just one sub-
stitution, i.e. we do not need to change more propositional variables simultaneously.
This raises the question whether one can just make do with single substitutions. This
is indeed the case. Consider the scheme [p := ϕ,σ]ψ ↔ [q := ϕ][σ][p := q]ψ where
q does not occur in [σ]ψ. This formula is a tautology, and allows one to show that
simple substitutions are equally expressive as simultaneous substitutions.
4.2. Completeness for public updates
There are two problems for a direct approach to proving completeness for update
logics: modal logics with update operators are not normal modal logics2 and modal
logics with a transitive closure operator (such as (relativised) common knowledge) are
not compact, i.e. it is not the case that an inﬁnite set of formulas is satisﬁable, if every
ﬁnite subset of that inﬁnite set.
Modal logics with update operators are not normal because the rule of uniform
substitution is no longer sound. This rule allows one to substitute a propositional vari-
able for an arbitrary formula uniformly. The idea behind uniform substitution is that if
a formula is a tautology, then it is true in every model no matter what the extension of
the propositional variables in the formula is. Therefore one can uniformly substitute
a propositional variable for a complex formula, which also has a certain extension. In
public update logics propositional variables play a special role. Their truth value is not
effected by public announcements, although the truth value of complex formulas can
be effected by them. Examples of such formulas are so-called unsuccessful updates:
formulasthatbecomefalsebytheirannouncement(Gerbrandy,1998;vanDitmarschet
al., n.d.), a concept closely related to Moore’s paradox. Consider the tautology [p][a]p.
If we replace p with (p ∧ ¬[a]p) the result is the formula [(p ∧ ¬[a]p)][a](p ∧ ¬[a]p).
This is not a tautology. Hence the uniform substitution is unsound in this case. In the
case of public substitution propositional variables also play a special role. Only the
extension of propositional variables can be changed directly, not of complex formulas.
Moreover, given that the extension of a propositional variable can be set to the ex-
tension of a complex formula by a public substitution, the extension of propositional
variables cannot be seen as being arbitrary within the scope of a public assignment.
2. See of Hughes and Cresswell (1996, p.25) or Blackburn et al. (2001, p.33) for the deﬁnition
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Consider the tautology [p := ⊤]q ↔ q, where p and q are different propositional
variables. If we replace q with p, we get [p := ⊤]p ↔ p, which is not a tautology.
So, the rule of uniform substitution is also unsound in this case. General methods for
proving completeness for a modal logic are geared towards normal modal logics (for
example Blackburn et al. (2001)). Therefore one cannot apply these methods directly
to dynamic epistemic logics.
The other difﬁculty in providing completeness results for (dynamic) epistemic log-
ics, is that when (relativised) common knowledge is in the language, the logic is no
longer compact. Therefore one cannot easily construct a canonical model where the
worlds are maximal consistent sets of formulas, because it can occur that an inﬁnite set
of formulas is consistent, but not satisﬁable. This problem also occurs in propositional
dynamic logic, where it is solved by making a ﬁnite canonical model, depending on
the particular formula one is interested in (Kozen et al., 1981). In this way only weak
completeness is attained3. One can adopt a similar method for dynamic epistemic
logics with common knowledge, as was done by Baltag et al. (1999).
Compared to a direct approach to completeness for dynamic epistemic logics, an
approach with reduction axioms is much more straightforward. And given the gen-
erality of the approach we can easily deal with many logics simultaneously. We will
reduce the logics under consideration to three base languages: LA, LAC and LAR.
As we remarked earlier, for these there are known complete Hilbert-style proof sys-
tems. Table 1 shows which reduction axioms for the additional operators should be
added to which base system. The numbers refer to the reduction axioms in Deﬁni-
tion 12. The extensions that are not considered are left blank4.
Table 1. The table indicates which reduction axioms are to be added to the base proof
systems
P S C
LA 1–4 6–9
LAC 6–10
LAR 1–5 6–9,11 12
THEOREM 16. —
3. Strong completeness of a proof system PS with respect to a class of frames F is the property
that Γ |=F ϕ implies that Γ ⊢PS ϕ for every set of formulas Γ and every formula ϕ. This
generalises weak completeness, where Γ is empty.
4. Thecellintheupperrightofthetableisleftblank, becauseaddingcommonknowledgetoLA
yields LAC, which is dealt with in the second row. The cell below is left blank because adding
common knowledge to a language that already contains common knowledge does not make a
difference. The cell in the middle left column of the table is left blank because adding public
announcements to the language with common knowledge, yields a more expressive language,
which can therefore not be dealt with using reduction axioms.Public update logics 249
1) The proof system for LA together with the appropriate reduction axioms from
Table 1 and the rule of substitution of equivalents is complete for LAP, for LAS and
for LAPS.
2) The proof system for LAC together with reduction axioms 6–10 and the rule of
substitution of equivalents is complete for LASC.
3) The proof system for LAR together with the appropriate reduction axioms from
Table 1 and the rule of substitution of equivalents is complete for LAPR, LASR,
LAPSR, LACR, LAPCR, LASCR, and LAPSCR.
PROOF. — In order to prove all these results Theorem 11 is applied. We already
showed that all the reduction axioms and the rule of substitution of equivalents are
sound. From the literature, complete proof systems for LA, LAC and LAR were ob-
tained. In the same way as was shown in the proof of Theorem 15, we can show that in
each case a formula in the richer language contains a subformula to which a reduction
axioms applies. Therefore by Theorem 11 all the proof systems are complete. ￿
5. A complete proof system for LAPSC
The only new result that cannot be obtained using the reduction axioms given
in the previous section is a complete proof system for LAPSC. In the proof that
LAR ≡ LAPSC I showed that LAPSC ≡ LAPSCR where LAPSCR was reduced
to LAPSC. Since LAPSCR also reduces to LAR it followed that LAR ≡ LAPSC.
So LAPSC was not reduced to LAR. Such a reduction is in fact impossible, since
neither language is a sublanguage of the other. This example leads to a more general
question how one might obtain a complete proof system for one language by using a
known proof system for an equally expressive logic, but neither is a sublanguage of
the other. In Section 6 we return to this question. In this section we solve a particular
problem of this kind.
A complete proof system for LAPSC can also be constructed based on the ob-
servation that LAPSC is equally expressive as LAR. The way to do it is as follows.
There is a complete proof system for LAR that is also complete for LAPSCR if it
is extended with the appropriate reduction axioms. The difference between the lan-
guage LAPSCR and LAPSC is that the latter does not contain relativised common
knowledge, but there is a reduction axiom for it (reduction axiom 13). The idea is
that if we apply this reduction axiom to the proof system for LAPSCR we obtain a
complete proof system for LAPSC. In other words, we let [p := ψ][ϕ][B+]p play the
role of [(B;?ϕ)+]ψ and thus adapt the proof system for LAPSCR. Every occurrence
of [(B;?ϕ)+]ψ is replaced by [p := ψ][ϕ][B+]p and the freshness of p is set as a side
condition. In this way the following proof system presents itself.
DEFINITION 17. — The proof system APSC consists of reduction axioms 1–4 and
6–9 from Deﬁnition 12 together with the rule of substitution of equivalents and the
following axioms and rules.
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2) [α](ϕ → ψ) → ([α]ϕ → [α]ψ)
3) [p := ψ][ϕ][B+]p ↔ [B](ϕ → (ψ ∧ [p := ψ][ϕ][B+]p))
where p does not occur in ϕ.
4) [p := (ψ → [B](ϕ → ψ))][ϕ][B+]p → ([B](ϕ → ψ) → [p := ψ][ϕ][B+]p)
where p does not occur in ϕ.
5) [ϕ][p := ψ][χ][B+]p ↔ [p := [ϕ]ψ][ϕ ∧ [ϕ]χ][B+]p))
where p does not occur in [ϕ]ψ.
6) [σ][p := ϕ][ψ][B+]p ↔ [p := [σ]ϕ][[σ]ψ][B+]p))
where p does not occur in [σ]ψ.
7) [B+]ϕ ↔ [p := ϕ][⊤][B+]p
8) From ϕ and ϕ → ψ, infer ψ
9) From ϕ, infer [α]ϕ
Axioms 3 and 4 look really difﬁcult, but close examination reveals that they are
direct translations of the mix axiom and the induction axiom for relativised common
knowledge5 respectively. Axioms 5, 6 and 7 are direct translations of the reduction
axioms 5, 11 and 12 from Deﬁnition 12 respectively.
THEOREM 18 (COMPLETENESS). — For every ϕ ∈ LAPSC if |= ϕ, then ⊢APSC ϕ.
PROOF. — Suppose |= ϕ, where ϕ ∈ LAPSC. This formula is also in LAPSCR.
Therefore, by Theorem 16, there is a proof of this formula in the proof system for
LAPSCR using the proof system for LAR with the appropriate reduction axioms.
With the proof system for LAPSC one can simulate this proof by replacing every
expression of the form [(B;?ϕ)+]ψ with [p := ψ][ϕ][B+]p. So, indeed ⊢APSC ϕ. ￿
6. Conclusion and further questions
In this paper dynamic epistemic logics with public announcements and public sub-
stitutions were studied. With these logics one can study speech acts and model other
kindsofpublicinformationchange, includinglearninginformationaboutthepast. The
focus of this paper is mainly on completeness and expressivity via reduction axioms.
The general method given in Section 3 can actually be applied to other logics outside
the ﬁeld of dynamic epistemic logic as well. The results in Section 5 suggest that the
method could also be extended to cases where one is presented with three languages
L1, L2 and L3, where L1 ⊆ L3 and L2 ⊆ L3, and there are reduction axioms to
reduce L3 both to L1 and L2. If a complete proof system is available for only L1, a
complete proof system for L2 can be obtained by applying the reduction axioms for
5. The mix axiom and induction axiom are the following:
[(B;?ϕ)
+]ψ ↔ [B](ϕ → (ψ ∧ [(B;?ϕ)
+]ψ))
[(B;?ϕ)
+](ψ → [B](ϕ → ψ)) → ([B](ϕ → ψ) → [(B;?ϕ)
+]ψ)
See also (Kooi et al., 2004).Public update logics 251
L2 to the proof system for L1 extended with the reduction axioms that allowed the
reduction of L3 to L1.
The method of using reduction axioms seems related to work on term rewriting
systems, as is also indicated by Baltag et al. (1999). Reduction axioms can be seen as
rewrite rules, and, interpreted in these terms Lemma 10 states that the term rewriting
system terminates. In fact this follows from a general theorem from term rewriting
that states that a term rewriting system terminates iff there exists a so-called reduction
order. The order induced by the O reduction depth is such a reduction order. See
Baader and Nipkow (1998, p.102–103) for a deﬁnition of reduction orders and the
theorem. The connection between reduction axioms and term rewriting should be
further explored.
As the results show, the logic LAPSC is really more expressive than LAPC. Re-
markably, this is the only example where the language with public substitutions is
more expressive than the language without public substitutions. In all other cases the
expressivity remained the same. It is still the case however, as the examples in Sec-
tion 2 show, that it is very convenient to have these operators in the language.
It would be interesting to study the relation between the logics presented in this
paper and the notion of update as it is studied in the ﬁeld of belief revision (Katsuno
et al., 1992; Herzig et al., 1999), where the term ‘update’ is given quite a different
meaning than in dynamic epistemic logic. One receives the information that a formula
ϕ has become true, and one has to adapt one’s information state to accommodate this
information. In terms of the logics presented in this paper such an update can best be
conceived of as an announcement that some private substitution has occurred of which
the postcondition is ϕ. In dynamic epistemic logic, announced formulas are taken as
preconditions of the announcements.
If one were to generalise the notion of substitution to include private substitution
and further enrich the language, it seems that the statement ψ ∈ K ⋆ ϕ regarding
updates6 in the belief revision literature would correspond to [
S
{σ | [σ]ϕ}][a]ψ), i.e.
after you learn that the world has somehow changed such that ϕ is now true, you know
that ψ. When it is assumed that this change is minimal, the corresponding formulation
would be [ {σ | [σ]ϕ}][a]ψ), i.e. after you learn that the smallest change has occurred
such that ϕ has become true, you know that ψ.
This perspective shows that there are different questions one may want to answer
when the world changes.
– Given some preconditions and an action, what are the postconditions?
– Given an action and some postconditions, what are the preconditions?
– Given some preconditions and some postconditions, what actions enable this?
Dynamic epistemiclogic triestoanswertheﬁrstquestion. Itseemsthattheapproaches
to update in the belief revision literature try to answer the last question: a question
6. The expression ψ ∈ K ⋆ ϕ indicates that ψ is in the knowledge base K after it has been
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at the centre of computer science. Given an algorithmic problem, one knows what
desired output is given the input, but not which algorithm implements the transition.
The second question seems interesting from the point of diagnostics. It is known
which program is running and what the results are, and one has to ﬁgure out what the
initial conditions were. A systematic integrated account of all three questions certainly
seems worthwhile.
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